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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States stands alone among industrialized nations in its
insistent espousal of the employment-at-will doctrine for employees
not protected by statutes or collective bargaining agreements. The
strength of American employer opposition to any limitation on at-will
employment was dramatically illustrated during the International La-
bour Organization's consideration of a 1982 proposal providing that
employment of a worker shall not be terminated except for a valid
reason.1 The United States government and employer delegates were
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1. Convention on Termination of Employment Adopted by ILO Convention in Ge-
neva, 121 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-1 (June 23, 1982).
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joined by representatives of Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Brazil, and
Chile as the only delegates voting against this proposal. AFL-CIO del-
egates supported the convention.2
Explaining his vote, the American employer delegate said: "The
U.S. business community is opposed to this erosion of the principle of
termination of employment at will.... We stand alone with this type
of system and in view of this we will oppose the convention .... ,,3
The importance of at-will employment to employers is understand-
able in view of the large number of employees who are terminated for
noneconomic reasons in the United States. United States Labor De-
partment data indicate that the annual discharge rate in manufactur-
ing is in excess of four percent.4 If this percentage were applied to the
private sector labor force as a whole, it would suggest that about three
million employees are discharged each year.5 A 1980 study of Michi-
gan employers stratified by industry, size, and union/nonunion status
found a discharge rate of 6.8 percent for nonoffice workers and 5.3
percent for office employees. 6 "Discharge occurred most frequently
among service employees (10.5 percent) and was lowest for employees
in financial organizations (3.7 percent). The rate in manufacturing
and construction was 4.8 percent."7 For all categories of employees,
the discharge rate for nonunionized employees was twice that of un-
ionized workers.8 While there are no reliable comparative data, therm
is little doubt that noneconomic terminations, usually referred to in
the United States as "discharge for cause," occur more frequently in
the United States than in other industrialized nations. 9
The Michigan experience with employment-at-will and the contin-
uing controversy over individual employment rights in the United
States must be considered within the context of the extraordinary im-
portance that employers attach to maintaining at-will employment
and the extent of noneconomic terminations in this country. After
California, Michigan is often cited as the state which has experienced
the greatest erosion of the employment-at-will doctrine in the United
2. Id. The total delegate vote was: 356 in favor, 9 against, and 54 abstentions.
3. Id. (statement of employer delegate: Paul J. Weinberg).
4. See Medoff, Layoffs and Alternatives Under Trade Unions in U.S. Manufactur-
ing, 69 AiM. EcoN. REv. 380, 389 (1979).
5. See Rodgers & Stieber, Employee Discharge in the 20th Century: A Review of the
Literature, 108 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 35, (1985).
6. Stieber, Recent Developments in Employment-At-Will, 36 LAB. L.J. 557, 559
(1985).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Hepple, Rojot, Weiss, Treu, and General Discussion among Conference Partici-
pants, The Foreign Experience and Appendices A-D, in PROTECTING UNORGAN-
IZED EMPLOYEES AGAINST UNJUST DISCHARGE 46-80, 135-68 (J. Stieber and J.
Blackburn eds. 1983). (Proceeding of a Conference held at Michigan State Uni-
versity, Sept. 28-30, 1980).
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States.'0 This impression is mainly due to the 1980 Michigan Supreme
Court decision Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield."1 There, the
court held that when an employer has agreed that an employee hired
for an indefinite term shall not be discharged except for cause, the
employer may not terminate the employment without cause.12 Tous-
saint was significant in its treatment of the effect of handbooks and
personnel manuals on the employment relationship. The case departs
substantially from the weight of authority set forth in other courts'
decisions.'3
Prior to Toussaint, Michigan had followed several other states in
recognizing the public policy exception to employment-at-will. How-
ever, Michigan has not adopted the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing exception which courts in several other states have either ac-
cepted or indicated a willingness to consider. 14
This article will examine the Michigan courts' approach to indefi-
nite employment contracts in the 19th century, pre-Toussaint deci-
sions on at-will employment, the supreme court's reasoning in
Toussaint, court interpretations of Toussaint through 1986, and public
policy exceptions to employment-at-will. The article will also discuss
proposed legislation and guidelines for a law to provide just cause pro-
tection against wrongful discharge for all employees.
II. APPLICATION OF WOOD'S RULE IN MICHIGAN
In an 1877 treatise,15 Horace G. Wood articulated a view regarding
an employee's job security which soon became the general rule
throughout the United States. Wood's rule, as it came to be called,
stated that a hiring for an indefinite period was presumptively a hiring
at will which could be terminated at any time by either party.16
One of the four authorities cited by Wood in support of his rule was
a Michigan case, Franklin Mining Co. v. Harris.17 However, a careful
reading of that case yields little support for the view that an employ-
ment contract had to be for a definite period in order to be binding.
10. Wald & Wolf, Recent Developments in the Law of Employment at Will, 1 LAB.
LAW. 533, 534 (1985).
11. 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2c1 880 (1980).
12. Id. at 609-10, 292 N.W.2d at 890.
13. A.B.A., EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL: A 1985 STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY 185 (D. Cath-
cart and M. Dichter eds. 1985).
14. The following states are listed as recognizing the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing in A Survey of Wrongful Discharge Cases in the United States (M.
Dichter, A. Gross, & M. Banks eds. Sept. 1985): Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Cali-
fornia, Connecticut, Iowa, Massachusetts, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire,
and Oklahoma.
15. H. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT 272-73 (1877).
16. Id.
17. 24 Mich. 115 (1871).
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Plaintiff Harris had given up his previous job to accept employment at
Franklin Mining.'s Harris was to be paid $1,800 per year and was as-
sured by Franklin Mining's agent that he need not fear the company's
frequently changing management might jeopardize his continuing em-
ployment.' 9 Yet, he was discharged eight months after starting the
job - prompting him to sue for four months' pay under his alleged
one-year contract.2 0 On the ground there was evidence of a contract
for at least one year duration, the Michigan Supreme Court unani-
mously affirmed the trial court's judgment entered on the jury verdict
for the plaintiff.21 This may have led to Wood's belief that an employ-
ment contract must have a definite duration in order to avoid an em-
ployment-at-will characterization. But the court did not say this. It
simply treated the case as a matter of basic contract law and not as a
case centering on the employment relationship. Indeed, in describing
Harris' previous job as "apparently a permanent one,"22 the court
might even be said to have supported the concept of binding indefinite
employment contracts.
Further evidence that the Michigan Supreme Court did not follow
Wood's rule is found in the 1894 case of Chamberlain v. Detroit Stove
Works.23 Plaintiff Chamberlain claimed his employment with the
company "was distinct and separate from the [elective] office of secre-
tary"2 4 - to which he was not reelected.2 5 The court held that while
the defendant had a right to terminate the plaintiff's official position
as secretary, "it does not conclusively follow that another relation did
not exist, dependent upon the engagements and contracts of the par-
ties."2 6 As to such other relationship, the court said:
(We think the circumstances might warrant the conclusion that the parties
mutually understood that the employment was to continue. What the relation
was, and hoy long it was to continue, depended upon the original hiring, the
subsequent relation, the nature of the services performed, and the mutual un-
derstanding of the parties. As to duration, we think it was competent for the
jury to determine from the evidence that the hiring was annual, and not sub-
ject to revocation or change by the board of directors or the president. It per-
haps goes without saying that a contract for a year could not exist unless the
circumstances warrant the inference that the parties so understood it. Such
agreement or understanding may be inferred from a custom or usage which
the parties may be considered as having contemplated. We think that the
court properly left this question to the jury.2 7
18. Id. at 115-16.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 116-17.
22. Id.
23. 103 Mich. 124, 61 N.W. 532 (1894).
24. Id. at 129, 61 N.W. at 534.
25. Id. at 127, 61 N.W. at 533.
26. Id. at 129, 61 N.W. at 534.
27. Id. at 129-30, 61 N.W. at 534 (citations omitted).
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Chamberlain appears to have been a forerunner of the "implied con-
tract exception" articulated eighty-six years later in Toussaint.
In 1896 the Michigan Supreme Court again affirmed the jury's right
to find an oral employment contract for a year or longer in Graves v.
Lyon Bros.28 Plaintiff Graves argued that, although for the first two
years he had been a month-to-month employee, his status changed
when:
On January 4, 1893 ... the manager of the defendant informed him that his
'pay would have to be reduced to $600 for the year;' that he replied, 'If that was
all he could pay he [plaintiff] would go on doing his work.' About the middle
of March plaintiff was discharged.
2 9
The defendant denied the existence of the conversation and that there
had been any change in plaintiff's employment status.3 0 Nonetheless,
the court held that "it is a fair inference... that the contract was one
for a year."31 Were the Michigan Supreme Court following Wood's
rule, it is doubtful that the mere mention of what might well be
termed only a rate of pay would have sufficed to override the employ-
ment-at-will presumption.
Starting in 1904 with Sullivan v. Detroit, Ypsilanti & Ann Arbor
Ry.,32 the Michigan Supreme Court increasingly adhered to Wood's
rule. In the summer or fall of 1897, after being promised that he
would be the "permanent attorney" of the company if it turned out to
be successful, Sullivan provided legal advice and services to incorpo-
rate the defendant railway.3 3 If the railway was not a success, Sulli-
van was to receive no compensation other than expenses.34 On March
15, 1898, the railway's board of directors passed a resolution that Sulli-
van be employed as attorney for one year at an annual salary of
$1,500.35 Sullivan was paid $125 per month for one year, after which
he submitted a bill of $15,000 for services rendered from November
1897 to March 1898.36 The company denied liability, but at trial Sulli-
van received a verdict and judgment for $9,028.37 On appeal the issue
was whether "permanent" meant employment for life or at least as
long as the company continued to exist absent cause for dismissal.
The court noted that the life of the corporation was for 30 years, and it
therefore "follows that this contract was either a contract binding for
30 years upon the defendant, or else it was terminable at the will of
28. 110 Mich. 670, 68 N.W. 985 (1896).
29. Id. at 671, 68 N.W. at 986.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. 135 Mich. 661, 98 N.W. 756 (1904).
33. Id. at 661-62, 98 N.W. at 756.
34. Id. at 662, 98 N.W. at 756.
35. Id. at 664, 98 N.W. at 757.
36. Id.
37. Id.
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either party."38 The court cited various authorities for both view-
points, and decided it was "impossible to conclude that the parties who
made this contract contemplated that the plaintiff was to be employed
for 30 years, or as long as he was able to do the legal work of the
defendant."39
While Sullivan opened the door to recognition of Wood's rule, it
was not until 1937 that the rule was fully accepted in Michigan. In
Lynas v. Maxwell Farms,40 the plaintiff had agreed to sell his restau-
rant to become manager of Maxwell Farms. Despite the fact that "[a]t
the time he accepted the offer of Mr. Case [defendant's president] it
was understood that he was to have a permanent lifetime position
with the defendant,"4 ' Lynas was dismissed after 14 months.42
Although there was differing testimony as to the reason for his dismis-
sal, the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff.43 The court, how-
ever, entered judgment notwithstanding the verdict (J.N.O.V.) for the
defendant.44
On appeal, the Michigan Supreme Court affirmed the judgment
and summarized the prevailing American view of permanent employ-
ment contracts: "In general it may be said that in the absence of dis-
tinguishing features or provisions or a consideration in addition to the
services to be rendered, such contracts are indefinite hirings, termina-
ble at the will of either party."4 5 The court found that Lynas' sale of
his restaurant at far below its real value in order to accept employ-
ment with the defendant could not be deemed the "special considera-
tion other than the services to be performed by the employee"
necessary to overcome the employment-at-will relationship.46 Ac-
cording to the court, Lynas""sacrifice" of his restaurant provided him
no greater rights than any other at-will employee.47 Although Lynas'
employment was termed "permanent," it actually was for only so long
as his services were satisfactory, and "whether or not the services
were satisfactorily performed was a question to be determined by de-
fendant and not by the jury."48
A year later, in Adolph v. Cookware Co. of America,49 the supreme
court - citing Lynas as controlling precedent - found another per-
38. Id. at 675, 98 N.W. at 760-61.
39. Id. at 676, 98 N.W. at 761.
40. 279 Mich. 684, 273 N.W. 315 (1937).
41. Id. at 686, 273 N.W. at 316.
42. Id. at 686-87, 273 N.W. at 316.
43. Id. at 687, 273 N.W. at 316.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 688-89, 273 N.W. at 317.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 689, 273 N.W. at 317.
49. 283 Mich. 561, 278 N.W. 687 (1938).
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manent oral employment contract to be terminable-at-will. Adolph, a
practicing chiropractor, had agreed to write a health book for the de-
fendant and then to become head of its health extension depart-
ment.5 0 The court sustained Adolph's subsequent discharge and held
that even if the plaintiff had an oral contract for permanent employ-
ment, "[s]uch a contract is for an indefinite period and, unless for a
consideration other than promise of services, the employment was ter-
minable at the will of either party."51 Echoing Lynas, the court as-
serted, "[t]he action of plaintiff in giving up the practice of his
profession was but an incident necessary on his part to place himself
in a position to accept and perform the contract and not a price or
consideration paid to defendant for the contract of employment."52
Twenty-four years later, in Ambrose v. Detroit Edison Co.,53 the
supreme court reiterated its holdings in Sullivan, Lynas, and Adolph
that an agreement for "permanent employment" was actually
equivalent to one for an "indefinite period" subject to termination at
the will of either party. In Ambrose, however, the court went beyond
its previous position to rule that the defendant's written in-house dis-
charge procedures were not subject to judicial review because the de-
fendant was acting on its own to provide extra protection which was
not mandated by law.M
III. TOUSSAINT v. BLUE CROSS & BLUE SHIELD
Since 1980, Michigan law in wrongful discharge cases alleging vio-
lations of an implied employment contract has been based on Tous-
saint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield.55 Courts in other states as well as
federal courts have often referred to Toussaint in rulings on wrongful
discharge suits. It is therefore important to set forth in some detail
the majority holding in this landmark decision.
Toussaint joined two separate cases with similar but somewhat dif-
ferent surrounding circumstances.56 Plaintiffs Toussaint and Ebling
were middle management employees who were discharged after serv-
ing five and two years for Blue Cross and Masco Corporation respec-
tively.5 7 Both claimed that they had inquired and were assured orally
of job security when hired.58 When Toussaint was hired in 1967, he
50. Id. at 564-66, 278 N.W. at 687-88.
51. Id. at 568, 278 N.W. at 689.
52. Id.
53. 367 Mich. 334, 116 N.W.2d 726 (1962).
54. Id. at 338-39, 116 N.W.2d at 728.
55. 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980).
56. The companion case was Ebling v. Masco Corp., 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880
(1980).
57. Id. at 595, 292 N.W.2d at 883. Prior to 1975 Blue Cross and Blue Shield were
separate organizations. In 1975 they were consolidated into a single company.
58. Id. at 595, 598, 610, 292 N.W.2d at 883, 884, 890.
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was also handed a "Supervisory Manual" and a pamphlet of "Guide-
lines" which contained personnel policies and stated that it was the
policy of the company to release employees "for just cause only."5 9
Toussaint alleged he was discharged without cause and the jury
awarded him $73,000 after the trial court denied the defendant's mo-
tion for a directed verdict.60
Ebling alleged that he was discharged before the third anniversary
of his employment in order to prevent him from exercising a stock
option which had appreciated substantially in value. A jury awarded
Ebling $300,000 and the court denied a motion for judgment notwith-
standing the verdict.6 1 In 1977, different appeals court panels reversed
Toussaint62 and affirmed Ebling.63 Consolidating the cases, the
supreme court reversed Toussaint and affirmed Ebling.64 Although
all seven judges voted to affirm Ebling,65 three also would have af-
firmed the court of appeals in Toussaint.66
The majority decision noted that the court of appeals in Toussaint
saw Lynas as mandating reversal on the ground that a contract for
permanent employment or employment for life is one for an indefinite
period terminable at will, and cannot be made otherwise by a provi-
sion that an employee will not be discharged except for cause.67 On
the other hand, in Ebling the court of appeals held that the plaintiff's
discharge should be distinguished from the general rule of employ-
ment-at-will because his employment agreement contained "distin-
guishing features or provisions or a consideration in addition to the
services to be rendered." 68
The supreme court considered the two cases to be factually indis-
tinguishable and presenting an issue submissible to a jury as to
whether or not there was a valid agreement to terminate for cause
only.69 If anything, the court regarded Toussaint's case as stronger
because of the Handbook statement that it was company policy to re-
lease employees "for just cause only," while Ebling was only told that
he would not be discharged if he did his job.70 The court held that:
1) a provision of an employment contract providing that an employee
59. Id. at 638-40, 292 N.W.2d at 903-04 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
60. Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 79 Mich. App. 429,432,262 N.W.2d 848,850
(1977).
61. Ebling v. Masco Corp., 79 Mich. App. 531, 532, 261 N.W.2d 74, 75 (1977).
62. Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 79 Mich. App. 429, 262 N.W.2d 848 (1977).
63. Ebling v. Masco Corp., 79 Mich. App. 531, 261 N.W.2d 74 (1977).
64. Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980).
65. Id. at 636, 292 N.W.2d at 902 (Ryan, J., concurring).
66. Id. at 651, 292 N.W.2d at 909 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 596, 292 N.W.2d at 883-84.
68. Id. at 596, 292 N.W.2d at 884.
69. Id. at 597, 292 N.W.2d at 884.
70. Id.
1988]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
shall not be discharged except for cause is legally enforceable although the
contract is not for a definite term - the term is "indefinite," and
2) such a provision may become part of the contract either by express
agreement, oral or written, or as a result of an employee's legitimate expecta-
tions grounded in an employer's policy statements.
3) In Toussaint, as in Ebling, there was sufficient evidence of an express
agreement to justify submission to a jury.
4) A jury could also find for Toussaint based on legitimate expectations
grounded in his employer's written policy statements set forth in the manual
of personnel policies.
7 1
The supreme court distinguished Toussaint from previous cases
where the issue was whether, assuming a contract for "permanent"
employment, that employment was terminable at the will of the em-
ployer.72 The issue in Toussaint was whether, "assuming an employ-
ment contract for an indefinite term, the employment must be
terminable at will so that the employer could not enter into a legally
enforceable agreement to terminate the employment only for
cause."
73
The following points in the opinion have provided guideposts for
decisions in later cases:
1. Employers are free to enter into terminable-at-will contracts
without regard to cause. However, an employer's express agreement
to terminate only for cause, or statements of policy to that effect, can
give rise to rights enforceable in contract.
2. When an employer gives up its right to discharge at will, an
employee, if discharged without good or just cause, may bring suit for
wrongful discharge.
3. There is no public policy against providing job security or
prohibiting discharge except for cause. Consequently, there is no rea-
son why a contract for an employee without a definite term should
necessarily be unenforceable and against public policy and beyond an
employer's right to contract.
4. If the employers in Toussaint had desired, they could have es-
tablished company policies requiring employees to acknowledge that
they served at-will and thus have avoided misunderstandings and
litigation.
5. No pre-employment negotiations need take place and the par-
ties' minds need not meet on the subject [personnel policies]; nor does
it matter that the employee knows nothing of the particulars of the
employer's policies and practices or that the employer may change
them unilaterally. It is enough that the employer chooses, presuma-
bly in its own interest, to create an environment in which the em-
ployee believes that, whatever the personnel policies and practices,
71. Id. at 598-99, 292 N.W.2d at 885.
72. Id. at 609, 292 N.W.2d at 890.
73. Id. (emphasis in original).
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they are established and official at any given time, purport to be fair,
and are applied consistently and uniformly to each employee. The
employer has then created a situation 'instinct with an obligation.' 74
6. Having announced a just cause policy, presumably with a view
to obtaining positive employee attitudes and behavior and improved
performance, the employer may not treat the policy as illusory.
7. A promise to terminate for cause only would be illusory if the
employer were to be the sole judge and final arbiter of the propriety of
the discharge. There must be some review of the decision if the cause
contract is to be distinguished from the satisfaction contract. It is for
the jury to decide if discharge for specific misconduct was for the rea-
son stated. The jury must be permitted to determine the employer's
true motive for discharge and to decide whether the reason for dis-
charge amounts to good cause and is the kind of behavior that justifies
terminating the employee.
8. Employers who enter into a discharge for cause contract may
set their own standards of employee performance. The jury then de-
cides only if the employer had a rule and whether or not the employee
violated it.
9. The employer can avoid having to confront a jury by providing
an alternative method of dispute resolution, such as arbitration, on the
issues of cause and damages.
IV. POST-TOUSSAINT CASES
We have found forty-four reported cases in which wrongful dis-
charge was the sole or predominant basis in decisions by the Michigan
Court of Appeals, the Michigan Supreme Court, or federal courts in-
terpreting Michigan law.75 Excluded from this analysis are suits based
primarily on state and federal antidiscrimination statutes. Thirty-five
cases were based on an implied contract exception, seven on a public
policy exception, and two claimed both implied contract and public
policy exceptions to the general rule that - absent distinguishing fea-
tures or provisions or a consideration in addition to services rendered
- contracts for "permanent" or "life" employment are construed as
indefinite hirings terminable at the will of either party.76
74. Id. at 613,292 N.W.2d at 892 (footnote omitted) (quotation refers to Wood v. Lucy,
Lady Duff-Gordon, 222 N.Y. 88,118 N.E. 214 (1917), and McCall Co. v. Wright, 133
A.D. 62, 117 N.Y.S. 775 (1909)).
75. See infra notes 196-97, 208-09. However, Ariganello v. Scott Paper Co., 588 F.
Supp. 484 (E.D. Mich. 1982) applied Toussaint to an alleged promise of severance
pay.
76. For the implied contract cases, see infra notes 196-97; for the public policy cases,
see infra notes 208-09. The two cases using both theories are: Sitek v. Forest City
Enters., 587 F. Supp. 1381 (E.D. Mich. 1984); Hrab v. Hayes-Albion Corp., 103
Mich. App. 90, 302 N.W.2d 606 (1981).
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It is interesting to note that while Michigan is considered to be in
the forefront of litigation on wrongful discharge, it has not adopted
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing exception to employment-
at-will. Indeed, Michigan courts have defined public policy exceptions
quite narrowly. Even the implied contract exception, for which Michi-
gan has become so widely recognized, has not yielded very favorable
results for plaintiffs.
A. Status of At-Will Policy Statements
A number of employers in Michigan have chosen to adopt written
employment-at-will contracts. Since Toussaint, courts in at least ten
cases decided in favor of defendants on the basis of at-wil provisions
in employee handbooks, manuals, or other company statements.77
The supreme court in Toussaint held that employers could protect
against wrongful discharge suits based on implied contract theories by
having a clearly stated policy that employees may be terminated at the
will of the employer without regard to cause. A classic example of
such a contract is that of Sears, Roebuck, and Co., which had a termi-
nable-at-will policy before Toussaint. The Sears employment applica-
tion - which all prospective employees are asked to sign - states in
part:
In consideration of my employment, I agree to conform to the rules and
regulations of Sears, Roebuck and Co., and my employment and compensation
can be terminated, with or without cause, and with or without notice, at any
time, at the option of either the Company or myself. I understand that no
store manager or representative of Sears, Roebuck and Co., other than the
president or vice-president of the Company, has any authority to enter into
any agreement for employment for any specified period of time, or to make
any agreement contrary to the foregoing.
7 8
Under Toussaint, such a provision allows an employer to safely termi-
nate an employee without regard to cause. This led the federal district
court in Novosel v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. to state: "Based on this agree-
ment there is no way that the plaintiff could reasonably have had a
legitimate expectation of a right to a just cause determination prior to
77. See Reid v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 790 F.2d 453 (6th Cir. 1986); Ringwelski v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 636 F. Supp. 519 (E.D. Mich. 1985); Summers v. Sears, Roe-
buck & Co., 599 F. Supp. 1157 (E.D. Mich. 1982); Sitek v. Forest City Enters., 587
F. Supp. 1381 (E.D. Mich. 1984); Novosel v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 495 F. Supp. 344
(E.D. Mich. 1980); Riethmiller v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 151 Mich. App. 188,
390 N.W.2d 227 (1986); Ford v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 150 Mich. App. 462, 390
N.W.2d 227 (1986); Eliel v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 150 Mich. App. 137, 387 N.W.2d
842 (1985); Longley v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 136 Mich. App. 336, 356 N.W.2d
20 (1984); Ledl v. Quik Pik Food Stores, Inc., 133 Mich. App. 583, 349 N.W.2d 429
(1984).
78. Novosel v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 495 F. Supp. 344, 346 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (empha-
sis omitted).
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termination."79 Five of the implied contract cases reported in Michi-
gan were brought by Sears employees.80 The plaintiffs lost each of
these cases.
In Summers v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,81 the court found that the
Sears contractual provision, though it refers to termination, also pre-
cluded a legitimate expectation of a right to a just cause determination
prior to demotion.8 2 By extending the Sears at-wil contract to an is-
sue other than termination, the court expanded considerably the scope
of such provisions.
A possible chink in the Sears-type provision was opened in Reid v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co.,83 where the court said:
While such language may well bar a Toussaint claim in some cases, it seems to
me that an automatic barring application thereof is a negation of what this
writer perceives to be the essential meaning of Toussaint - that there may be
terms of the contract of employment implied in fact from the actions of the
employer and its agents. The signing of an employment application as here, 17
years before the incident complained of and the automatic ignoring of any and
all facts occurring thereafter as bearing on an employee's employer-induced
expectation of some type of longevity in employment, seems a particularly
unjust and unjustified interpretation of Toussaint which ought not to be auto-
matically applied in this court without the Michigan court's authoritative rul-
ing to that effect.84
The court then evaluated the plaintiff's arguments and concluded that
all she had was a "subjective belief that she could be terminated only
for just cause, but that belief alone created no enforceable contract
rights."85
In the five other at-will provision cases, including three against
Blue Cross & Blue Shield,86 the courts ruled against plaintiffs on the
ground that employees had signed terminable-at-will statements in
job applications or while employed by defendant employers, or that
there was a handbook containing an at-will provision. It is interesting
to note that the three cases in which Blue Cross & Blue Shield was the
defendant involved discharges which occurred after the consolidation
79. Id.
80. See Reid v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 790 F.2d 453 (6th Cir. 1986); Ringwelski v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 636 F. Supp. 519 (E.D. Mich. 1985); Summers v. Sears, Roe-
buck & Co., 549 F. Supp. 1157 (E.D. Mich. 1982); Novosel v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
495 F. Supp. 344 (E.D. Mich. 1980); Eliel v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 150 Mich. App.
137, 387 N.W.2d 842 (1985).
81. 549 F. Supp. 1157 (E.D. Mich. 1982).
82. Id. at 1161.
83. 588 F. Supp. 558 (E.D. Mich. 1984), aff'd 790 F.2d 453 (6th Cir. 1986).
84. Id. at 561.
85. Id.
86. See Riethmiller v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 151 Mich. App. 188, 390 N.W.2d 227
(1986); Ford v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 150 ich. App. 462, 389 N.W.2d 114
(1986); Longley v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 136 Mich. App. 336, 356 N.W.2d 20
(1984).
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of the two companies in 1975. The joined organization's handbook
contained the following provision: "Just as any employee may resign
at any time and for any reason, the company, because of legal consid-
erations, reserves the right to release an employee at any time for any
reason."8 Based on the above-quoted handbook provision, Blue Cross
& Blue Shield has prevailed in wrongful discharge suits decided after
Toussaint.
In affirming a summary judgment in Longley v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield,88 the court of appeals held that the plaintiff - who was dis-
charged in 1976 - knew she could be dismissed with or without cause,
and was therefore precluded from claiming she had any expectation
that she could only be terminated for cause.8 9 The Blue Cross & Blue
Shield handbook provision was also sustained in two 1986 cases, Ford
v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield 90 and Riethmiller v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield.91 In Ford, the jury awarded three plaintiffs discharged for fal-
sifying payroll records amounts of $10,000, $6,625 and $5,930 (appar-
ently because the three had not been given exit interviews as called
for in the employee handbook).92 The appellate court reversed and
remanded for entry of a directed verdict for the defendant and stated:
"The fact that the employer chooses to codify it [the exit interview]
cannot in and of itself, transform the 'at will' contract into a contract
with a 'just cause' termination provision."9 3 In Riethmiller, the court
of appeals affirmed the trial court's finding that Blue Cross & Blue
Shield had not breached an implied employment contract when it ter-
minated a physician (again based on an employee handbook at-will
provision).9 4 Dr. Riethmiller did, however, have his judgment of
$103,624 (plus interest, taxable costs and attorneys' fees) upheld on
the basis of unlawful age discrimination.95
As of this writing, awaiting a Michigan Supreme Court ruling is the
very important question of whether an employer's terminable-at-will
policy is applicable to employees hired before the policy was estab-
lished. In Ledl v. Quik Pik Food Stores, Inc.,96 an appeals court panel
affirmed the trial court grant of summary judgment for the defendant
in a case involving a fifty-seven-year old managerial employee who
87. Longley v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 136 Mich. App. 336, 338, 356 N.W.2d 20, 21
(1984) (quoting Blue Cross & Blue Shield's employee handbook).
88. 136 Mich. App. 336, 356 N.W.2d 20 (1984).
89. Id. at 340-42, 356 N.W.2d at 22-23.
90. 150 Mich. App. 462, 389 N.W.2d 114 (1986).
91. 151 Mich. App. 188, 390 N.W.2d 227 (1986).
92. Ford v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 150 Mich. App. 462, 464, 389 N.W.2d 114, 115
(1986).
93. Id. at 467, 389 N.W.2d at 116.
94. Riethniller v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 151 Mich. App. 188,198, 390 N.W.2d 227,
232 (1986).
95. Id. at 203, 390 N.W.2d at 234.
96. 133 Mich. App. 583, 349 N.W.2d 529 (1984).
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had worked eight years for Quik Pik. Six months before her dis-
charge, the plaintiff had signed an agreement that stated she could be
terminated with or without notice or cause, despite having been told
when hired that she would be continued as long as her service was
satisfactory.97 The court, quoting from Toussaint, stated:
An employer who establishes no personnel policies instills no reasonable ex-
pectation of performance. Employers can make known to their employees
that personnel policies are subject to unilateral changes by the employer. Em-
ployees would then have no legitimate expectation that any particular policy
will continue to remain in force. Employees could, however, expect that poli-
cies in force at any given time will be uniformly applied to all.9 8
Paying little heed to the plaintiff's allegation that she had signed an
adhesion contract, the court read Toussaint as indicating that the de-
fendant could properly change its employment policies and make
them applicable to employees hired prior to the change.99
The Ledl decision has since been called into question by three
other appellate decisions. In Bullock v. Automobile Club,100 the plain-
tiff claimed the defendant had breached its employment contract by
demoting him for failing to meet a unilaterally imposed production
standard which allegedly violated his preexisting contract. The Michi-
gan Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court (though not with the
lower court's reasoning) that "[w]hether there was a legitimate and
reasonable expectation in the employee that an employer's policy or
practice is a term of the employment contract which bears directly
upon the question of whether the employer is free to unilaterally
change the policy or practice is for the trier of fact."10 ' In Farrell v.
Automobile Club,102 another appeals court panel cited Bullock as hav-
ing correctly interpreted Toussaint as holding "that notice or knowl-
edge of unilateral changes can be construed from the circumstances
surrounding employment"' 0 3 and that "whether such notice or knowl-
edge was ever given to an employee was a question for the trier of
fact."104 The court in Farrell then affirmed a jury verdict of $150,000
in favor of the plaintiff - who had been terminated for failure to meet
minimum production requirements - and it remanded for reduction
97. Id. at 586-87, 349 N.W.2d at 531.
98. Id. at 587-88, 349 N.W.2d at 531 (quoting Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield,
408 Mich. 579, 619, 292 N.W.2d 880, 894-95 (1980)).
99. Id. at 587, 349 N.W.2d at 531. For a different view on employer disclaimers, see
Steiner & Dabrow, The Questionable Value of the Inclusion of Language Con-
firming Employment-at-Will Status in Company Personnel Documents, 37 LAB.
L.J. 639 (1986).
100. 146 Mich. App. 711, 381 N.W.2d 793 (1985).
101. Id. at 721, 381 N.W.2d at 797.
102. 155 Mich. App. 378, 399 N.W.2d 531 (1986).
103. Id. at 386, 399 N.W.2d at 536.
104. Id. at 387, 399 N.W.2d at 536.
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of future damages to their present value.105 It is interesting to note
that neither Bullock nor Farrell made any reference to Ledl.
Bullock was also cited as authority in a third case, Scholz v. Mont-
gomery Ward & Co., 10 6 in which the Michigan Court of Appeals af-
firmed a jury verdict of $16,503 for wrongful discharge and $8,250 for
religious discrimination, plus interest, costs, and attorneys' fees.
When Scholz was hired in 1970 as a salesperson, she was told that she
would not have to work Sundays. 107 At that time, the store was not
open on Sundays; subsequently, however, Montgomery Ward decided
to remain open on Sundays.1 08 In 1982, Scholz, along with all of her
coworkers, signed an agreement stating that she understood she could
be terminated at any time "with or without cause, and without any
previous notice."109 The agreement also said Scholz understood that
rules governing her employment could be changed without notice at
any time.1 10 In 1983, she was discharged for refusing to work
Sundays.11 1
Montgomery Ward filed an application for leave to appeal to the
Michigan Supreme Court in April 1987.112 (In an amicus curiae brief,
the Michigan Manufacturers Association argued that the court of ap-
peals erred in holding that the plaintiff's at-will contract did not su-
persede and defeat her alleged prior oral agreement in accordance
with the supreme court's decision in Toussaint. 113) Assuming leave to
appeal is granted, the supreme court's decision in Scholz should re-
solve the thorny and highly important issue as to whether an em-
ployer's adoption of an at-will policy is binding on employees hired
before the policy was established.
In Damrow v. Thumb Cooperative Terminal, Inc.,114 the court of
appeals held that a "just cause" provision, adopted by an employer
eight months after an employee was hired, was nonetheless binding
upon the employer when the employee was dismissed after the man-
ual provision was instituted. This holding is consistent with the deci-
sion in Ledl, though it favors the employee rather than the employer.
Should the supreme court reverse Scholz v. Montgomery Ward & Co.,
it would raise a serious question regarding the Damrow-type case.
105. I. at 391, 399 N.W.2d at 538.
106. No. 86118 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986).
107. Amicus Curiae Brief in Support of Leave to Appeal of Michigan Manufacturers
Association at 1, Sholz v. Montgomery Ward & Co., No. 80709 (Mich. July 20,
1987).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 2 (quoting employment-at-will agreement signed by plaintiff).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 3.
112. Scholz v. Montgomery Ward & Co., No. 80709 (Mich. July 20, 1987).
113. Id. at 6.
114. 126 Mich. App. 354, 337 N.W.2d 338 (1983).
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(Damrow was remanded for trial. However, we have learned that the
defendant employer went out of business before the trial and the
plaintiff therefore failed to recover any damages.)
B. Mental Distress Damages for Breach of Implied Contract
In affirming an appellate decision in Valentine v. General Ameri-
can Credit, Inc.,115 the supreme court stated that "a person discharged
in breach of an employment contract may not recover mental distress
damages."116 In explaining its ruling, the court stated:
An employment contract will indeed have a personal element. Employment is
an important aspect of most persons' lives, and the breach of an employment
contract may result in emotional distress. The primary purpose in forming
such contracts, however, is economic and not to secure the protection of per-
sonal interests. The psychic satisfaction of the employment is secondary.
Mental distress damages have not been awarded where there is a market
standard by which damages can be adequately determined. Valentine's mone-
tary loss can be estimated with reasonable certainty according to the terms of
the contract and the market for, or the market value of, her service. Mental
distress damages are not awarded an employee found to have been wrongfully
discharged in violation of a collective bargaining agreement.1 1 7
In Chamberlain v. Bissell, Inc.,"18 the federal district court ruled
that although the defendant had good cause to discharge the plaintiff
(a manager of Manufacturing Engineering with 22 years of service) it
was still liable for negligent job evaluation for failing to notify him
during his evaluation of the impending discharge.119 The court fur-
ther stated that "while a complete failure to perform a contractual
obligation may be actionable only as a breach of contract, the negli-
gent performance of the obligation is actionable as a tort." 2 0 The
court also noted that a "cause of action for negligent job evaluation has
already been recognized in the Michigan courts in the wake of the
Toussaint opinion."' 2 ' Assessing damages of $360,906 ($210,906 in
compensatory and $150,000 in mental distress damages), the court
ruled that the plaintiff was entitled to recover only 17 percent of ac-
tual damages ($61,354) plus interest because of his own "high degree of
contributory negligence."1 22
115. 420 Mich. 256, 362 N.W.2d 628 (1984).
116. Id. at 263, 362 N.W.2d at 631.
117. Id. Although Valentine was remanded for trial, it was settled prior to being
heard. Damages for mental distress, in a breach of contract action, were also de-
nied by the Michigan Court of Appeals in Brewster v. Martin Marietta Alumi-
num Sales, Inc., 145 Mich. App. 641, 378 N.W.2d 558 (1985).
118. 547 F. Supp. 1067 (W.D. Nich. 1982).
119. Id. at 1081-82.
120. Id. at 1081 (emphasis in the original).
121. Id. (citing Schipani v. Ford Motor Co., 102 Mich. App. 606, 302 N.W.2d 307 (1981)).
122. Id. at 1084 (W.D. Mich. 1982). With respect to negligent evaluation being a tort
per Chamberlain and Schipani, the court in Gach v. National Educ. Corp., No. 84-
1792, (E.D. Mich. Sept. 17, 1985) (Westlaw DCT database) asserted:
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C. Standards for Voluntary Arbitration
In Vander Toorn v. City of Grand Rapids,23 the court of appeals
reversed the trial court's ruling that the plaintiff's discharge claim
was not entitled to be heard by a jury. The lower court had based its
ruling upon the notion that the decision to terminate was made by an
administrative agency acting in a quasi-judicial capacity and therefore
the courts' scope of review under the Michigan Constitution was lim-
ited to determining whether the agency's decision was "supported by
competent, material and substantial evidence on the whole record."' 2 4
Applying this limited standard of review, the trial court affirmed the
agency's decision.12 5 The appeals court, however, held that the lower
court's dismissal of Vander Toorn's complaint on the ground that it
was subject only to limited judicial review was error because the Com-
mission was not functioning as a judicial or quasi-judicial administra-
tive agency under the city charter or an ordinance when it decided to
terminate the plaintiff.126 Noting that Toussaint allowed an employer
to avoid a jury trial by providing for binding arbitration, the court of
appeals went on to quote the supreme court's statement that the
"promise to terminate employment for cause only would be illusory if
the employer were permitted to be the sole judge and final arbiter of
the propriety of the discharge."' 2 7 The appeals court then held that
the arbiter referred to in Toussaint must be "impartial." 28 Since the
Commission, under the Museum's handbook procedure, had partici-
pated in the initial decision to discharge the plaintiff, it could not be
considered impartial.12 9 The court, therefore, reversed and remanded
for a jury trial.130
In Khalifa v. Henry Ford Hospital,131 the court of appeals held that
an Employee Grievance Council - consisting of nine non-supervisory
hospital employees (elected by their co-workers) whose decisions were
The law in Michigan, as reflected in Hart v. Ludwig, 347 Mich. 559 (1956),
is that a tort action will lie for conduct constituting a breach of contract
only if a legal duty existed apart from the contract.... This court recog-
nizes that its ruling as to plaintiff's claim for negligent evaluation of per-
formance is directly contrary to the decisions of Schipani v. Ford Motor
Co. and Chamberlain v. Bissell. This court does not follow these
decisions.
Id. at 5 (citations omitted).
123. 132 Mich. App. 590, 348 N.W.2d 697 (1984).
124. Id. at 594, 348 N.W.2d at 699-700 (quoting MICH. CONST. art. 6, § 28 (1963)).
125. Id. at 594, 348 N.W.2d at 700.
126. Id. at 597, 348 N.W.2d at 701.
127. Id. at 598, 348 N.W.2d at 701.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 598-99, 348 N.W.2d at 701.
130. Id. at 601-02, 348 N.W.2d at 703. We have learned that the case was settled with-
out a trial for $200,000-$240,000.
131. 156 Mich. App. 485, 401 N.W.2d 884 (1986).
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final and binding - met the Toussaint standard of an alternative
method of dispute resolution by an impartial arbiter.132 The plaintiff
argued that the hearing on his discharge was unfair and lacked due
process since: 1) he was not allowed to be present at the hearing ex-
cept to testify as a witness; 2) he had no opportunity to rebut evidence
and argument or to cross-examine witnesses; 3) no record was made of
the hearing; 4) representation of counsel was not permitted; and 5) the
personnel office representative - a professional on grievance proce-
dure who was involved in the decision to terminate - was permitted
to testify.133 Nonetheless, the court noted that, while some of the
plaintiff's claims would be valid in the context of a judicial proceed-
ing, the hearing still met the standard of fairness which is applied in
grievance arbitration.13 4 The court distinguished its ruling from that
in Vander Toorn, in which the grievance committee only had the
power to recommend action to the Museum Director and the Art and
Museum Commission, while the Employee Grievance Council's deci-
sion was final and binding on the parties. 3 5
In Renny v. Port Huron Hospital,3 6 the Michigan Supreme Court
explicitly set forth the elements necessary to meet the Toussaint stan-
dard for an alternative method of dispute resolution. Renny, a regis-
tered nurse, was discharged for allegedly verbally intimidating a
subordinate.137 A jury awarded her $100,000 in damages for wrongful
discharge.13 8 The court of appeals affirmed,139 as did the supreme
court in a 4-3 decision.140 Rejecting the defendant's internal grievance
procedure, the supreme court majority stated that the requirements
for a fair and legally acceptable adjudication in administrative and ar-
bitration proceedings are:
1) Adequate notice to persons who are to be bound by the adjudication;
2) The right to present evidence and arguments and the fair opportunity
to rebut evidence and argument by the opposing argument [sic] [party];
3) A formulation of issues of law and fact in terms of the application of
rules with respect to specified parties concerning a specific transaction, situa-
tion, or status;
4) A rule specifying the point in the proceeding when a final decision is
rendered; and,
5) Other procedural elements as may be necessary to ensure a means to
determine the matter in question. These will be determined by the complex-
ity of the matter in question, the urgency with which the matter must be re-
132. Id. at 491, 494-98, 401 N.W.2d at 887, 888-90.
133. Id. at 497, 401 N.W.2d at 890.
134. Id. at 498, 401 N.W.2d at 890.
135. Id. at 499, 401 N.W.2d at 890.
136. 427 Mich. 415, 398 N.W.2d 327 (1986).
137. Id. at 421, 398 N.W.2d at 331.
138. Id. at 417, 398 N.W.2d at 329.
139. Id. at 425, 398 N.W.2d at 333.
140. Id. at 439, 398 N.W.2d at 339.
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solved and the opportunity of the parties to obtain evidence and formulate
legal contentions.1 4 1
D. Extension of Toussaint to Non-Discharge Cases
In 1982 a federal district court held that Toussaint was not limited
to discharge cases. In Ariganello v. Scott Paper Co.,142 the court ruled
that thirty-eight former salaried employees stated a claim under Tous-
saint in their suit for severance pay when their plant was sold and
they were employed by the purchasing company. 43 The court found
there was an issue of fact as to whether the company had actually dis-
tributed to the plaintiffs a statement allowing the company not to
grant severance pay in the event of sale and reemployment of the em-
ployees by a successor company.'" However, in 1984, the Sixth Cir-
cuit affirmed that same district court's refusal to extend Toussaint to
layoffs without further guidance from the state courts.14 5 In Grubb v.
W.A. Foote Memorial Hospital, a hospital laundry supervisor claimed
breach of an implied employment contract when his position was elim-
inated.146 The Sixth Circuit agreed with the district court's refusal to
extend Toussaint to layoff policies because the Michigan courts had
not as yet applied Toussaint in situations that did not involve a wrong-
ful discharge from a continuing position.147
V. PUBLIC POLICY CASES
The public policy exception to the general rule of employment-at-
will has played a much less important role in wrongful discharge ac-
tions in Michigan than has the implied contract exception. Indeed, the
Michigan courts have been less venturesome in considering suits chal-
lenging discharge as a violation of public policy than some other state
courts.
Sventko v. Kroger Co.148 was the first case in which a Michigan
court recognized the public policy exception to the employment-at-
will doctrine. Sventko suffered a disabling injury while working for
defendant Kroger Co. in May 1973.149 Sventko did not file for work-
men's compensation until July and was still being treated for her in-
141. Id. at 437, 398 N.W.2d at 338 (citing the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS
§§ 83(2), 84(3)(b) (1982)).
142. 588 F. Supp. 484 (E.D. Mich. 1982).
143. Id. at 488-89.
144. Id. at 487. We have since discovered that settlements were reached in varying
amounts with the individual plaintiffs.
145. Grubb v. W.A. Foote Memorial Hosp., 741 F.2d 1486, 1488 (6th Cir. 1984).
146. Id. at 1488.
147. Id. at 1500.
148. 69 Mich. App. 644, 245 N.W.2d 151 (1976).
149. Id. at 646, 245 N.W.2d at 152.
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jury when she was fired in November 1973.150 Alleging she had been
wrongfully discharged in retaliation for filing the workmen's compen-
sation claim, Sventko brought an action against Kroger Co. in Decem-
ber 1974.151 The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendant on the grounds that the plaintiff was an at-will employee
and there was no provision in the Michigan workmen's compensation
statute prohibiting retaliatory discharges.152 In a split decision revers-
ing the trial court, a panel of the Michigan Court of Appeals stated:
[W]hile it is generally true that either party may terminate an employment at
will for any reason or for no reason, that rule is not absolute.... [T]he better
view is that an employer at will is not free to discharge an employee when the
reason for the discharge is an intention on the part of the employer to contra-
vene the public policy of this state. That the workmen's compensation statute
does not directly prohibit a retaliatory discharge by employers does not hinder
this opinion.153
The court also noted that the workmen's compensation act was to
"provide financial and medical benefits to the victims of work-con-
nected injuries in an efficient, dignified and certain form." 54 Conse-
quently, the court asserted, "discouraging the fulfillment of this
legislative policy by use of the most powerful weapon at the disposal of
the employer, termination of employment, is obviously against the
public policy of our state."1 55
Conspicuously absent from the opinion were any citations to cases
from other states which were on point. Rather, the court relied on its
notions of legislative intent and cases involving workmen's compensa-
tion issues and discrimination. In contrast, the concurring opinion did
cite a number of well-known non-Michigan cases, such as Petermann
v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters,5 6 Monge v. Beebe Rubber
Co.,157 and Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co. 158
Less than two years later, the Michigan courts recognized the pub-
lic policy exception for the first time in a non-workmen's compensa-
tion case. In Trombetta v. Detroit, Toledo & Ironton RR/,159 a railroad
employee sued for wrongful discharge, alleging he was fired for refus-
ing to alter pollution control reports. The trial court granted the de-
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. See also MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 418 (West 1984).
153. Sventko v. Kroger Co., 69 Mich. App. 644, 646, 245 N.W.2d 151, 152 (1976).
154. Id. at 646-47, 245 N.W.2d at 153 (quoting Whetro v. Awkerman, 388 Mich. 235, 242,
174 N.W.2d 783, 785 (1970) (Kavanagh, J., dissenting)).
155. Id. at 648, 245 N.W.2d at 153.
156. 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959).
157. 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974).
158. 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1979). Frampton was particularly relevant since the
Indiana Supreme Court allowed a worker fired for filing a workmen's compensa-
tion claim to sue her employer for retaliatory discharge. Id. at 256, 297 N.E.2d at
428-29.
159. 81 Mich. App. 489, 265 N.W.2d 385 (1978).
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fendant railroad summary judgment because the public policy
exception did not apply to modify the plaintiff's at-will status.160 The
lower court based its judgment on the ground that discharges for re-
porting alleged violations of Michigan's pollution control standards161
had not yet been classified by the appellate courts as a violation of the
public policy of the state.162
The court of appeals subsequently obliged the trial court in no un-
certain terms, by declaring:
It is without question that the public policy of this state does not condone
attempts to violate its duly enacted laws.
... Such action would clearly violate the law of this state.
Hence, we find that plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can be
granted, and therefore the trial court erroneously granted defendant's motion
for summary judgment on the basis of this ground. 16 3
However, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's summary
judgment, since no material issue of fact had been presented. Plain-
tiff's failure to submit any proof which would qualify as admissible
evidence at trial to contradict the sworn statements made by defend-
ants' agents contributed to the trial court's findings.164
It should be noted that, although the court of appeals may well
have been "right" in its expansion of the public policy exception, it
still was acting on its own authority as an appellate court. One won-
ders why the court did not cite various cases beginning with
Petermann to support and lend credence to its opinion. Indeed, even
though the court's interpretation of the law was reasonable, it would
have brought more momentum to the public policy exception in Mich-
igan had the court used some of the growing body of precedents from
around the country.
Following recognition of the public policy exception in Sventko and
Trombetta, the courts have held that an employer may not discharge
an employee for failing to disclose on his employment application that
he had previously filed for workers' compensation at another com-
pany,165 that an employee may not be terminated because he had been
subpoenaed by a grand jury,1 6 6 and that the termination of a secretary
to a federal court judge is not immune from challenge as a wrongful
discharge.167 The courts have also found that dismissals for
whistleblowing are in violation of public policy as expressed in the
160. Id. at 495, 265 N.W.2d at 388.
161. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 323.1 (West 1984).
162. Trombetta v. Detroit, Toledo & Ironton R.R., 81 Mich. App. 489, 495, 265 N.W.2d
385, 388 (1978).
163. Id. at 495-96, 265 N.W.2d at 388 (citations omitted).
164. Id. at 498, 265 N.W.2d at 389.
165. Coins v. Ford Motor Co., 131 Mich. App. 185, 347 N.W.2d 184 (1983).
166. Wiskotoni v. Michigan Nat'l Bank-West, 716 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1983).
167. Guercio v. Brody, 814 F.2d 1115 (6th Cir. 1987).
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Michigan Whistleblowers' Protection Act.1 6 8 The Michigan Supreme
Court, however, has refused to find public policy exceptions to the
general rule of employment-at-will when an employee was discharged
for absence from work due to a workers' compensation injury.169 The
court has also held that the Michigan Whistleblowers' Protection Act
did not apply to an internal corporate complaint and that the code of
ethics of a private professional association does not establish a public
policy.17o Federal courts in Michigan have held that discharge actions
for union activity were preempted from consideration under state law
by the National Labor Relations Act.171
In Goins v. Ford Motor Co.,' 72 a labor relations employee sued for
wrongful discharge after being fired by Ford in November 1977 for not
revealing on his medical history form, when hired, that he had re-
ceived workers' compensation benefits while employed at General
Motors.173 A jury awarded him $450,000, which was reduced by the
trial court to a present value of $270,439.50.174 The appeals court af-
firmed, stating:
We find no reason, as defendant suggests, to limit this rule only to employ-
ers who fire employees who file claims against them rather than previous em-
ployers. The public policy extends to situations such as this where the
employee argues an unlawful or retaliatory discharge because he or she filed a
worker's compensation claim against any employer, including a previous
employer.1 7 5
Contrary to the relatively expansive interpretation of public policy
in Goins was the supreme court ruling in C1ifford v. Cactus Drilling
Corp.176 Clifford was injured in December 1977 and received workers'
compensation payments for a period of five weeks. 77 Shortly after
returning to work, a recurrence of the pain caused by the injury forced
him to call in sick.17 s After being terminated the next day, Clifford
sued for wrongful discharge.179 The trial court granted summary
judgment for the defendant, 8 0 but a divided court of appeals panel
reversed.i8 1 The supreme court then reversed the appeals court, and
168. Melchi v. Burns Int'l Sec. Serv., 597 F. Supp. 575 (E.D. Mich. 1984); Watassek v.
Michigan Dept. of Mental Health, 143 Mich. App. 556, 372 N.W.2d 617 (1985).
169. Clifford v. Cactus Drilling Corp., 419 Mich. 356, 353 N.W.2d 469 (1984).
170. Suchodolski v. Michigan Consol. Gas Co., 412 Mich. 692, 316 N.W.2d 710 (1982).
171. Sitek v. Forest City Enters., 587 F. Supp. 1381 (E.D. Mich. 1984); Morris v. Chem-
Lawn Corp., 541 F. Supp. 479 (E.D. Mich. 1982).
172. 131 Mich. App. 185, 347 N.W.2d 184 (1983).
173. Id. at 190, 347 N.W.2d at 187.
174. Id. at 189, 347 N.W.2d at 187.
175. Id. at 194, 347 N.W.2d at 189.
176. 419 Mich. 356, 353 N.W.2d 469 (1984).
177. Id. at 359, 353 N.W.2d at 470.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 359-60, 353 N.W.2d at 470.
181. Clifford v. Cactus Drilling Corp., 109 Mich. App. 776, 312 N.W.2d 380 (1981).
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proclaimed: "We cannot agree ... that an employee's protection from
discharge in retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim nec-
essarily includes protection from discharge because of an absence from
work because of a work-related injury."1 8 2
In a lone dissent, Chief Justice Williams reviewed the case history
regarding the public policy exception in Michigan and other states and
concluded that "it would be myopic of this Court to narrowly define
'retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim' to exclude retali-
ation for absence because of a work-related injury."18 3 Additionally,
he argued:
If an employee may be discharged for an absence because of a work-related
disability for which the employee may receive compensation, the employee
will be reluctant to jeopardize his job security by filing a workers' compensa-
tion claim in conjunction with taking time off to attend a disability. Such a
practice effectively hampers an employee's right to workers' compensation
and thus contravenes public policy.1 8 4
In 1981, Michigan became the first state in the country to enact a
law to protect "whistleblowers." The Michigan Whistleblowers' Pro-
tection Act provides that:
An employer shall not discharge, threaten, or otherwise discriminate against
an employee regarding the employee's compensation, terms, conditions, loca-
tion, or privileges of employment because the employee reports or is about to
report, verbally, or in writing, a violation or a suspected violation of a law or
regulation or rule promulgated pursuant to law of this state, a political subdi-
vision of this state, or the United States to a public body, unless the employee
knows that the report is false, or because an employee is requested by a public
body to participate in an investigation, hearing, or inquiry held by that public
body, or a court action. 1 8 5
In Melchi v. Burns International Security Service, Inc.,8 6 the plain-
tiff, a security guard, alleged he had been discharged for revealing to
public officials and agencies the destruction and falsification of secur-
ity records and reports at a nuclear power facility. 8 7 Suing under the
Michigan Whistleblowers' Protection Act, Melchi was awarded $33,128
by a federal court. 88 The court, however, did not reinstate him -
although it was a possible remedy under the Act - because there was
some evidence he may have acted in part for an improper motive stem-
ming from apprehension over his perceived diminishing job
security. 8 9
182. Clifford v. Cactus Drilling Corp., 419 Mich. 356, 360, 353 N.W.2d 469, 471 (1984).
183. Id. at 369, 353 N.W.2d at 475 (Williams, C.J., dissenting).
184. Id. at 371, 353 N.W.2d at 475 (Williams, C.J., dissenting). Goins was not cited by
either the majority or the dissent in Clifford.
185. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 15.362 (West 1984).
186. 597 F. Supp. 575 (E.D. Mich. 1984).
187. Id. at 576-78.
188. Id. at 586.
189. Id.
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In Watassek v. Michigan Department of Mental Health,190 the
plaintiff, an attendant nurse in the Department of Mental Health who
was still a probationary employee, alleged that he had been termi-
nated for reporting incidents of patient abuse to his superior.19 ' The
appeals court affirmed the trial court's denial of summary judgment to
the defendant. In so doing, it cited the Whistleblowers' Protection Act
as well as Sventko and Trombetta - even though the plaintiff's termi-
nation occurred in 1976, five years before the Act was passed.192 The
case was remanded and awaiting trial at the time this article was
written.
In Suchodolski v. Michigan Consolidated Gas Co.,193 the supreme
court rejected the plaintiff's public policy exception claim on four
main grounds. First, the court held that alleged retaliation for at-
tempts to bring improper accounting and other practices to the atten-
tion of the plaintiff's superiors was "a corporate management dispute"
and not "the kind of violation of a clearly mandated public policy that
would support an action for retaliatory discharge."19 4 Furthermore,
according to the court:
The code of ethics of a private association [the Institute of Internal Auditors]
does not establish public policy. Nor is the regulation of public utilities suffi-
cient to sustain the plaintiff's action. The regulation of the accounting sys-
tems of utilities is not, as in the workers' compensation statute, directed at
conferring rights on the employees. Finally, we note that the plaintiff does
not claim that his discharge arose from his refusal to falsify reports or docu-
ments required by the Public Service Commission.1 95
Unlike in Watassek - where the appeals court held that the 1981
Whistleblowers' Protection Act was applicable to the plaintiff's
wrongful discharge claim arising during 1976 - the supreme court did
not refer to the Act in Suchodolski, although the termination also oc-
curred in 1976.
VI. STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF CASES
Since the Toussaint decision in 1980, we have found thirty-seven
reported cases based on an implied contract exception to the general
employment-at-will rule. At the trial court level, the issues in twenty-
five of these cases (67.6%) were decided for defendants,196 generally
190. 143 Mich. App. 556, 372 N.W.2d 617 (1985).
191. Id. at 558, 372 N.W.2d at 618.
192. Id. at 564, 372 N.W.2d at 621.
193. 412 Mich. 692, 316 N.W.2d 710 (1982).
194. Id. at 696, 316 N.W.2d at 712.
195. Id.
196. Reid v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 790 F.2d 453 (6th Cir. 1986); Kay v. United Technol-
ogies Corp., 757 F.2d 400 (6th Cir. 1985); Wickes v. Olympic Airways, 745 F.2d 363
(6th Cir. 1984); Grubb v. W.A. Foote Memorial Hosp., 741 F.2d 1486 (6th Cir.
1984); Ringwelski v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 636 F. Supp. 519 (E.D. Mich. 1985);
Sitek v. Forest City Enters., 587 F. Supp. 1381 (E.D. Mich. 1984); Taylor v. General
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on pretrial motions for summary judgment. Twelve (32.4%) were de-
cided for plaintiffs,197 either on denial of defendants' motions for sum-
mary judgment or on verdicts awarding damages to plaintiffs
(although settlements may have been reached later).
All reported state court decisions were appealed (state trial court
judgments are not reported), while only four of the fourteen cases de-
cided by federal district courts were appealed to the Sixth Circuit.198
Two cases were decided by the Michigan Supreme Court.199 Appellate
courts affirmed eleven trial court results for defendants200 and five for
Motors Corp., 588 F. Supp. 562 (E.D. Mich. 1984); Summers v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 549 F. Supp. 1157 (E.D. Mich. 1982); Rhoden v. Allstate Ins. Co., 115 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 4808 (E.D. Mich. 1982); Novosel v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 495 F. Supp. 344
(E.D. Mich. 1980); Valentine v. General Am. Credit, Inc., 420 Mich. 256, 362
N.W.2d 628 (1984); Dzierwa v. Michigan Oil Co., 152 Mich. App. 281, 893 N.W.2d
610 (1986); Riethmiller v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 151 Mich. App. 188, 390
N.W.2d 227 (1986); Eliel v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 150 Mich. App. 137, 387 N.W.2d
842 (1985); Cowdrey v. A.T. Transport, 141 Mich. App. 617, 367 N.W.2d 433 (1985);
Rasch v. City of East Jordan, 141 Mich. App. 336, 367 N.W.2d 856 (1985); Luce v.
Goetze Corp. of Am., 117 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3036 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984); Kipke v.
Lenawee County Bd., 138 Mich. App. 791, 360 N.W.2d 300 (1984); Longley v. Blue
Cross & Blue Shield, 136 Mich. App. 336, 356 N.W.2d 20 (1984); Ledl v. Quik Pik
Food Stores, Inc., 133 Mich. App. 583, 349 N.W.2d 429 (1984); Vander Toorn v. City
of Grand Rapids, 132 Mich. App. 590, 348 N.W.2d 697 (1984); Damrow v. Thumb
Coop. Terminal, 126 Mich. App. 354,337 N.W.2d 338 (1983); Schwartz v. Michigan
Sugar Co., 106 Mich. App. 471, 308 N.W.2d 459 (1981); Hrab v. Hayes-Albion Corp.,
103 Mich. App. 90, 302 N.W.2d 606 (1981); Hollowell v. Career Decisions, Inc., 100
Mich. App. 561, 298 N.W.2d 915 (1980).
197. Fletcher v. Advo Sys., Inc., 616 F. Supp. 1511 (E.D. Mich. 1985) (case set for trial;
confidential settlement reached later); Halsam v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 117 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 2950 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (court allowed exemplary damage claim to stand;
settled later for $50,000-$100,000); Ariganello v. Scott Paper Co., 588 F. Supp. 484
(E.D. Mich. 1982); Chamberlain v. Bissell, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 1067 (W.D. Mich.
1982); Renny v. Port Huron Hosp., 427 Mich. 415, 398 N.W.2d 327 (1986); Khalifa
v. Henry Ford Hosp., 156 Mich. App. 485, 401 N.W.2d 884 (1986); Farrell v. Auto-
mobile Club, 155 Mich. App. 378, 399 N.W.2d 531 (1986); Ford v. Blue Cross &
Blue Shield, 150 Mich. App. 188, 390 N.W.2d 227 (1986); Bullock v. Automobile
Club, 146 Mich. App. 711, 381 N.W.2d 793 (1985); Brewster v. Martin Marietta
Aluminum Sales, Inc., 145 Mich. App. 641, 378 N.W.2d 558 (1985); Obey v. McFad-
den Corp., 138 Mich. App. 767, 360 N.W.2d 292 (1984); Schipani v. Ford Motor Co.,
102 Mich. App. 606, 302 N.W.2d 307 (1981).
198. Raid v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 790 F.2d 453 (6th Cir. 1986); Kay v. United Technol-
ogies Corp., 757 F.2d 400 (6th Cir. 1985); Wickes v. Olympic Airways, 745 F.2d 363
(6th Cir. 1984); Grubb v. W.A. Foote Memorial Hosp., 741 F.2d 1486 (1984).
199. Renny v. Port Huron Hosp., 427 Mich. 415, 398 N.W.2d 327 (1986); Valentine v.
General Am. Credit, Inc., 420 Mich. 256, 362 N.W.2d 628 (1984).
200. Raid v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 790 F.2d 453 (6th Cir. 1986); Kay v. United Technol-
ogies Corp., 757 F.2d 400 (6th Cir. 1985); Wickes v. Olympic Airways, 745 F.2d 363
(6th Cir. 1984); Dzierwa v. Michigan Oil Co., 152 Mich. App. 281, 393 N.W.2d 610
(1986); Riethmiller v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 151 Mich. App. 188, 390 N.W.2d
227 (1986); Eliel v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 150 Mich. App. 137, 387 N.W.2d 842
(1985); Kipke v. Lenawee County Bd., 138 Mich. App. 791, 360 N.W.2d 300 (1984);
Longley v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 136 Mich. App. 336, 356 N.W.2d 20 (1984);
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plaintiffs.20 1 They reversed six lower court results for defendants202
and three for plaintiffs.203 All four federal district court judgments
that were appealed were affirmed.20 4 The Michigan Supreme Court
affirmed one decision for a plaintiff20 5 and one for a defendant.206 The
final outcome in the thirty-seven implied contract cases was 60 per-
cent in favor of defendants and 40 percent for plaintiffs.20 7
Of the nine public policy exception claims to employment-at-will
since 1980, the issues in five were decided for defendants,2 8 while four
cases20 9 went the plaintiffs' way at the trial court level. Four of these
Ledl v. Quik Pik Food Stores, Inc., 133 Mich. App. 583, 349 N.W.2d 429 (1984);
Schwartz v. Michigan Sugar Co., 106 Mich. App. 471, 308 N.W.2d 459 (1981); Hollo-
well v. Career Decisions, Inc., 100 Mich. App. 561, 298 N.W.2d 915 (1980).
201. Renny v. Port Huron Hosp., 427 Mich. 415,398 N.W.2d 327 (1986); Farrell v. Auto-
mobile Club, 155 Mich. App. 378, 399 N.W.2d 531 (1986); Bullock v. Automobile
Club, 146 Mich. App. 711, 381 N.W.2d 793 (1985); Brewster v. Martin Marietta
Aluminum Sales, Inc., 145 Mich. App. 641,378 N.W.2d 552 (1985); Schipani v. Ford
Motor Co., 102 Mich. App. 606, 302 N.W.2d 307 (1981).
202. Cowdrey v. A.T. Transport, 141 Mich. App. 617, 367 N.W.2d 433 (1985); Rasch v.
City of East Jordan, 141 Mich. App. 336, 367 N.W.2d 856 (1985); Luce v. Goetze
Corp. of Am., 117 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3036 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984); Vander Toorn v.
City of Grand Rapids, 132 Mich. App. 590, 348 N.W.2d 697 (1984); Damrow v.
Thumb Coop. Terminal, 126 Mich. App. 354, 337 N.W.2d 338 (1983); Hrab v.
Hayes-Albion Corp., 103 Mich. App. 90, 302 N.W.2d 606 (1981).
203. Khalifa v. Henry Ford Hosp., 156 Mich. App. 485, 401 N.W.2d 884 (1986); Ford v.
Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 150 Mich. App. 462, 389 N.W.2d 114 (1986); Obey v.
McFadden Corp., 138 Mich. App. 767, 360 N.W.2d 292 (1984).
204. Reid v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 790 F.2d 453 (6th Cir. 1986); Kay v. United Technol-
ogies Corp., 757 F.2d 100 (6th Cir. 1985); Grubb v. W.A. Foote Memorial Hosp., 741
F.2d 1486 (6th Cir. 1984); Wickes v. Olympic Airways, 745 F.2d 363 (6th Cir. 1984).
205. Renny v. Port Huron Hosp., 427 Mich. 415, 398 N.W.2d 327 (1986).
206. Valentine v. General Am. Credit, Inc., 420 Mich. 265, 362 N.W.2d 628 (1984).
207. See supra notes 196-97. Six cases in note 196 were reversed in favor of the plain-
tiffs: Cowdrey v. A.T. Transport, 141 Mich. App. 617, 367 N.W.2d 433 (1985);
Rasch v. City of East Jordan, 141 Mich. App. 336, 367 N.W.2d 856 (1985); Luce v.
Goetze Corp. of Am., 117 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3036 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984); Vander
Toorn v. City of Grand Rapids, 132 Mich. App. 590, 348 N.W.2d 697 (1984); Dam-
row v. Thumb Coop. Terminal, 126 Mich. App. 354,337 N.W.2d 338 (1983); Hrab v.
Hayes-Albion Corp., 103 Mich. App. 90, 302 N.W.2d 606 (1981). Three cases in
note 197 were reversed in favor of defendants: Khalifa v. Henry Ford Hosp., 156
Mich. App. 485, 401 N.W.2d 884 (1986); Ford v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 150
Mich. App. 462, 389 N.W.2d 114 (1986); Obey v. McFadden Corp., 138 Mich. App.
767, 360 N.W.2d 292 (1984).
208. Sitek v. Forest City Enters., 587 F. Supp. 1381 (E.D. Mich. 1984); Morris v. Chem-
Lawn Corp., 541 F. Supp. 479 (E.D. Mich. 1982); Clifford v. Cactus Drilling Corp.,
419 Mich. 356, 353 N.W.2d 469 (1984); Suchodolski v. Michigan Consol. Gas Co.,
412 Mich. 692, 316 N.W.2d 710 (1982); Hrab v. Hayes-Albion Corp., 103 Mich. App.
90, 302 N.W.2d 606 (1981).
209. Wiskotoni v. Michigan Nat'l Bank-West, 716 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1983); Melchi v.
Burns Int'l Sec. Serv., 597 F. Supp. 575 (E.D. Mich. 1984); Watassek v. Michigan
Dept. of Mental Health, 143 Mich. App. 556, 372 N.W.2d 617 (1985); Coins v. Ford
Motor Co., 131 Mich. App. 185, 347 N.W.2d 184 (1983).
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nine cases were heard by federal district courts.210 Six were ap-
pealed,211 but only one2i 2 went to the Michigan Supreme Court. One
case was appealed to the Sixth Circuit.213 On appeal, the lower court
result was affirmed in five cases214 and reversed in one.215 The final
outcome in public policy cases favored defendants in four cases216 and
plaintiffs in five cases.21 7
The foregoing results are fairly similar to those reported for the
United States for 1984 and 1985 by the American Bar Association
Committee on the "Development of the Law of Individual Rights and
Responsibilities in the Workplace." 218 Yet, the amounts awarded to
plaintiffs in Michigan cases were much lower than might be expected
for a state which has been ranked second only to California in the
extent to which the employment-at-will doctrine has allegedly been
eroded. Fifteen plaintiffs received court awards or agreed to monetary
damages through settlements.219 All of the awards and known settle-
210. Wiskotoni v. Michigan Nat'l Bank-West, 716 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1983); Melchi v.
Burns Int'l Sec. Serv., 597 F. Supp. 575 (E.D. Mich. 1984); Sitek v. Forest City
Enters., 587 F. Supp. 1381 (E.D. Mich. 1984); Morris v. Chem-Lawn Corp., 541 F.
Supp. 479 (E.D. Mich. 1982).
211. Wiskotoni v. Michigan Nat'l Bank-West, 716 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1983); Clifford v.
Cactus Drilling Corp., 419 Mich. 356, 353 N.W.2d 469 (1984); Suchodolski v. Michi-
gan Consol. Gas Co., 412 Mich. 692, 316 N.W.2d 710 (1982); Watassek v. Michigan
Dept. of Mental Health, 143 Mich. App. 556, 372 N.W.2d 617 (1985); Goins v. Ford
Motor Co., 131 Mich. App. 185, 347 N.W.2d 184 (1983); Hrab v. Hayes-Albion
Corp., 103 Mich. App. 90, 302 N.W.2d 606 (1981).
212. Suchodolski v. Michigan Consol. Gas Co., 412 Mich. 692, 316 N.W.2d 710 (1982).
213. Wiskotoni v. Michigan Nat'l Bank-West, 716 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1983).
214. Wiskotoni v. Michigan Nat'l Bank-West, 716 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1983); Clifford v.
Cactus Drilling Corp., 419 Mich. 356, 353 N.W.2d 469 (1984); Suchodolski v. Michi-
gan Consol. Gas Co., 412 Mich. 692, 316 N.W.2d 710 (1982); Watassek v. Michigan
Dept. of Mental Health, 143 Mich. App. 556, 372 N.W.2d 617 (1985); Goins v. Ford
Motor Co., 131 Mich. App. 185, 347 N.W.2d 184 (1983).
215. Hrab v. Hayes-Albion Corp., 103 Mich. App. 90, 302 N.W.2d 606 (1981).
216. Sitek v. Forest City Enters., 587 F. Supp. 1381 (E.D. Mich. 1984); Morris v. Chem-
Lawn Corp., 541 F. Supp. 479 (E.D. Mich. 1982); Clifford v. Cactus Drilling Corp.,
419 Mich. 356, 353 N.W.2d 469 (1984); Suchodolski v. Michigan Consol. Gas Co.,
412 Mich. 692, 316 N.W.2d 710 (1982).
217. Wiskotoni v. Michigan Nat'1 Bank-West, 716 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1983); Melchi v.
Burns Int'l Sec. Serv., 597 F. Supp. 575 (E.D. Mich. 1984); Watassek v. Michigan
Dept. of Mental Health, 143 Mich. App. 556, 372 N.W.2d 617 (1985); Goins v. Ford
Motor Co., 131 Mich. App. 185, 347 N.W.2d 184 (1983); Hrab v. Hayes-Albion
Corp., 103 Mich. App. 90, 302 N.W.2d 606 (1981).
218. Cited in Note, Individual Rights and Responsibilities in the Work Place, 1 LAB.
LAW. 89 (1985), and Report, Individual Rights and Responsibilities in the Work
Place, 2 LAB. LAW. 351 (1986).
219. Wiskotoni v. Michigan Nat'l Bank-West, 716 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1983); Fletcher v.
Advo Sys., Inc., 616 F. Supp. 1511 (E.D. Mich. 1985); Haslam v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 117
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2950 (E.D. Mich. 1984); Melchi v. Burns Int'l Sec. Serv., 597 F.
Supp. 575 (E.D. Mich. 1984); Chamberlain v. Bissell, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 1067 (W.D.
Mich. 1982); Renny v. Port Huron Hosp., 427 Mich. 415, 398 N.W.2d 327 (1986);
Valentine v. General Am. Credit, Inc., 420 Mich. 256, 362 N.W.2d 628 (1984); Far-
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ments were well below $1,000,000. The largest award was $740,000220
with the strong likelihood that the final settlement was for a lesser
amount, since it was reached while on appeal by the defendant to the
Michigan Supreme Court. Four awards and settlements were in the
$100,000-$500,000 range,22 ' three were between $50,000 and $99,000,222
five were for less than $50,000,223 and two were confidential.224
We realize that reported court decisions represent only a very
small proportion of all wrongful discharge suits. Not all state appeals
court or federal court cases are reported, and most trial court judg-
ments are not appealed. Even more numerous are the cases that are
settled at the pretrial level or at some stage of the litigation process.
Some attorneys specializing in employment rights litigation estimate
that over 90 percent of the cases they handle are settled at the pretrial
stage. However, it is unlikely that pretrial settlements and unre-
ported trial court awards which were not appealed were for amounts
substantially exceeding those in reported cases.
California is the only state for which we have found trial court de-
cisions summarized over a time-frame comparable to the period cov-
ered in this study of Michigan. Using data from Jury Verdicts
Weekly, a non-official reporting service that relies on voluntary par-
ticipation by attorneys and court officials, a California law firm com-
piled a "Summary of Wrongful Discharge and Related Cases Which
Concluded With a Jury Verdict" for the period October 1979 to Sep-
tember 1986.225 This summary reported 112 jury verdicts during the
rell v. Automobile Club, 155 Mich. App. 378, 399 N.W.2d 531 (1986); Brewster v.
Martin Marietta Aluminum Sales, Inc., 145 Mich. App. 641,378 N.W.2d 558 (1985);
Rasch v. City of East Jordan, 141 Mich. App. 336, 367 N.W.2d 856 (1985); Cowdry
v. A.T. Transport, 141 Mich. App. 617, 367 N.W.2d 433 (1985); Vander Toorn v.
City of Grand Rapids, 132 Mich. App. 590, 348 N.W.2d 697 (1984); Luce v. Goetze
Corp. of Am., 117 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3036 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984); Goins v. Ford Mo-
tor Co., 131 Mich. App. 185, 347 N.W.2d 184 (1983); Hrab v. Hayes-Albion Corp.,
103 Mich. App. 90, 301 N.W.2d 606 (1981).
220. Brewster v. Martin Marietta Aluminum Sales, Inc., 145 Mich. App. 641, 378
N.W.2d 558 (1985).
221. Renny v. Port Huron Hosp., 427 Mich. 415,398 N.W.2d 327 (1986); Farrell v. Auto-
mobile Club, 155 Mich. App. 378, 399 N.W.2d 531 (1986); Vander Toorn v. City of
Grand Rapids, 132 Mich. App. 590, 348 N.W.2d 697 (1984); Goins v. Ford Motor
Co., 131 Mich. App. 185, 347 N.W.2d 184 (1983).
222. Wiskotoni v. Michigan Nat'l Bank-West, 716 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1983); Haslam v.
Pepsi-Cola Co., 117 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2950 (E.D. Mich. 1984); Chamberlain v. Bis-
sell, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 1067 (W.D. Mich. 1982).
223. Melchi v. Burns Int'l Sec. Serv., 597 F. Supp. 575 (E.D. Mich. 1984); Valentine v.
General Am. Credit, Inc., 420 Mich. 256, 362 N.W.2d 628 (1984); Rasch v. City of
East Jordan, 141 Mich. App. 336, 367 N.W.2d 856 (1985); Luce v. Goetze Corp. of
Am., 117 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3036 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984); Hrab v. Hayes-Albion
Corp., 103 Mich. App. 90, 302 N.W.2d 606 (1981).
224. Fletcher v. Advo Sys., Inc., 616 F. Supp. 1511 (E.D. Mich. 1985); Cowdrey v. A.T.
Transport, 141 Mich. App. 617, 367 N.W.2d 433 (1985).
225. Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe, Summary of Wrongful Discharge and Related
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seven year period, of which seventy-three (65.2%) were for plaintiffs
and thirty-nine (34.8%) favored defendants.226 Ten of the verdicts
were for amounts of over $1,000,000 and many others were in the six
figure range.227 Forty-two verdicts awarded emotional distress and/or
punitive damages.228 Undoubtedly, many of these awards were or will
be reduced in settlements or even set aside on appeal.
Another California report found fifty-one jury verdicts in wrongful
discharge cases during the 1986 calendar year.229 Seventy-eight per-
cent of these verdicts favored plaintiffs and averaged $424,527, includ-
ing two for over $1,000,000.230 Punitive damages averaging $494,000
were awarded in forty percent of the cases won by plaintiffs.23 1 This
report also estimated that of 314 state and federal appellate court cases
in 1985, jury verdicts usually favored plaintiffs and averaged $200,000
to $400,000.232
Allowing for reduction or even elimination of some of the above-
cited awards, Michigan's experience with wrongful discharge actions
would hardly qualify it as a fertile state for such suits as compared
with California or even the nation as a whole.
VII. AVOIDING AND DEFENDING AGAINST WRONGFUL
DISCHARGE SUITS
The proliferation of wrongful discharge suits in the courts and the
reporting of sizable jury awards in business, professional, and trade
journals as well as in the popular media has alerted employers to the
potential risks involved in terminating employees in violation of pub-
lic policy or in contravention of written and oral company policies.
Management attorneys and consultants frequently participate in con-
ferences and symposiums advising employers on how to avoid wrong-
ful discharge actions and how to defend against them if and when they
do occur. Any employer which has not examined its personnel poli-
cies and/or sought professional advice on their adequacy to protect
against wrongful discharge suits is probably not sufficiently astute to
survive in today's business climate, quite apart from the organization's
personnel policies.
Cases Which Concluded With a Jury Verdict (Oct. 1979 to Sept. 1986) (unpub-
lished report).
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Schachter, Kristoff, Ross, Sprague & Curiale, Summary Analysis of Reported
California Jury Verdicts in Wrongful Discharge Cases (1986) (unpublished
report).
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Key Wrongful Discharge Ruling Expected Shortly from California Supreme
Court, 197 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-4 (Oct. 10, 1986).
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In Michigan, the advice given to employers has been strongly influ-
enced by the supreme court's decision in Toussaint. Employers are ad-
vised to decide whether they wish to follow an "at-will" or a "just
cause" policy (sometimes referred to as the "hard" and the "soft" ap-
proach) in employee dismissals.
Employers who choose "at-will" are urged to state clearly and ex-
plicitly in employment application forms and/or handbooks that em-
ployment is at-will and may be terminated by either party with or
without reason or notice. A model for at-will employers is the Sears,
Roebuck-type contract referred to earlier in several cases. Based on
court decisions in actions against companies with at-will employment
policies, these provisions have proved an excellent defense against
wrongful discharge claims. Companies using this approach must still
guard against commitments, promises, or intimations to employees by
recruiters, supervisors, or other organization representatives that
their employment is "permanent" or otherwise assured excepting
good cause for termination. As the federal district court stated in Reid
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,233 even as definitive an at-will statement as
that of Sears, Roebuck cannot serve as an "automatic" bar to a wrong-
ful discharge claim.23 4 The facts and circumstances must be examined
and evaluated to see if there was an "employer-induced expectation"
of continuing employment.235 Nonetheless, such a written policy
statement requires strong evidence to overcome the at-will
presumption.
The major drawback to this so called "hard" at-will approach is
that it presents a bad organizational image to the prospective em-
ployee and may dissuade some highly qualified individuals from ac-
cepting employment in the organization. Employers who are
concerned about their image and ability to recruit superior employees
will probably choose to follow the "soft" or "just cause" policy in dis-
missing employees.
Briefly stated, a just cause policy would include procedures for un-
organized employees which are very similar to those provided to un-
ionized workers in most collective bargaining agreements, excluding
only final and binding adjudication by an impartial arbitrator. Such a
procedure might include a fair hearing before one or more responsible
management officials not involved in the incident giving rise to the
termination, or before a committee of elected coworkers. Reasons for
dismissal should be supported by personnel records, including per-
formance evaluations, evidence of previous warnings or disciplinary
actions, an opportunity for the discharged employee to present evi-
dence and witnesses and to cross-examine opposing witnesses, and
233. 588 F. Supp. 558 (E.D. Mich. 1984).
234. See id. at 561.
235. See id.
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other requirements of a fair hearing as set forth in Renny 2 6 and
Watassek. 237
Some management attorneys advise clients to seriously consider fi-
nal and binding arbitration by a neutral person for their unorganized
employees. The Michigan Supreme Court specifically recognized the
arbitration alternative in Toussaint, stating: "The employer can avoid
the perils of jury assessment by providing for an alternative method of
dispute resolution. A written agreement for a definite or indefinite
term to discharge only for cause could, for example, provide for bind-
ing arbitration on the issues of cause and damages."2 38
One management attorney has listed, in an unpublished article,239
the following employer advantages of the arbitration option:
Procedural
1) Time limits can be determined by contract or in a handbook,
e.g., 30 days as opposed to six years for commencing a breach of con-
tract suit.
2) There is no pretrial discovery, depositions, and interrogations.
This avoids scrutiny by the discharged employee or his attorney of em-
ployer records.
3) Arbitrators are professionals and more impartial than juries.
4) The award is relatively swift as compared with litigation.
5) Costs are much lower than for litigation. (Another manage-
ment attorney estimated that it costs her employer $15,000 to $40,000
in attorney's fees to win a wrongful discharge suit at the summary
judgment stage.240 The employer's share of arbitration fees averages
$1,000 to $2,000 without an attorney, and less than $5,000 if an attorney
is used.
Substantive
1. The remedy can be defined by contract, e.g., reinstatement,
back pay, and benefits less earnings while awaiting arbitration.
2. Arbitrators' awards are likely to be more predictable than jury
verdicts.
236. Renny v. Port Huron Hosp., 427 Mich 415, 398 N.W.2d 327 (1986).
237. Watassek v. Michigan Dept. of Mental Health, 143 Mich. App. 556, 372 N.W.2d 617
(1985).
238. Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 624, 292 N.W.2d 880, 897
(1980). See also Renny v. Port Huron Hosp., 427 Mich. 415, 398 N.W.2d 327 (1986);
Khalifa v. Henry Ford Hosp., 156 Mich. App. 485, 401 N.W.2d 884 (1986); Vander
Toorn v. City of Gr.nd Rapids, 132 Mich. App. 590, 348 N.W.2d 697 (1984).
239. Rosenfeld, Outline for the American Arbitration Association (AAA), Detroit Re-
gion, Seminar (June 6, 1986) (unpublished).
240. Alternative Dispute Resolution Explored in Employment Context, 53 Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) A-7 (Mar. 20, 1987) (citing Mary O'Callaghan, Canteen Corp.).
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3. Under Toussaint, an employer may establish its own perform-
ance standards and dismiss an employee for failing to meet them.
Such standards may not be subject to challenge on grounds of "reason-
ableness" - as long as the employer is consistent in their application.
Possible disadvantages of arbitration for some employers might in-
clude the unacceptability of reinstatement as a remedy, being unable
to wear down the resolve of the discharged employee through litiga-
tion procedures, and the very limited availability of appealing the arbi-
trator's award.
Since Toussaint, the at-will approach appears to be much more
popular with Michigan employers than either the just cause or the vol-
untary arbitration approach. A survey conducted in New York State
found that fifty percent of responding companies had recently
changed the language in their handbooks to clarify their employment-
at-will policy.24 1 As noted above, Michigan courts have almost always
sustained dismissals by employers with such provisions.
VIII. LIMITATIONS OF LITIGATION
The major beneficiaries of developments of the last two decades
leading to some erosion of the employment-at-will doctrine have been
middle- and upper-level managerial employees. Hourly workers and
lower-level salaried workers are rarely listed as plaintiffs in reported
wrongful discharge actions. Only seven of thirty-six Michigan deci-
sions in which the plaintiff's occupation was reported involved rela-
tively low-paid employees.2 = Among the more typical titles of
plaintiffs were: vice-president, safety director, office manager, sales-
person, terminal manager, and senior auditor. A similar occupational
distribution was found in another reported study of ninety-two wrong-
ful discharge cases, of which only eight involved "secondary market"
employees.24 3
Since hourly and lower-level salaried employees obviously far out-
number managerial employees among the total of all discharged work-
ers, their relative scarcity in reported decisions requires some
explanation. There are several reasons for this phenomenon. Lower-
paid workers are not likely to be aware of recent changes in the at-will
241. Attorney says Companies are Moving to Forestall Wrongful Firing Suits, 242
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-21 (Dec. 17, 1984) (citing Joseph Barbash).
242. Guercio v. Brody, 814 F.2d 1115 (6th Cir. 1987); Ringwelkski v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 636 F. Supp. 519 (E.D. Mich. 1985); Melchi v. Burns Int'l. Sec. Serv., 597 F.
Supp. 575 (E.D. Mich. 1984); Reid v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 588 F. Supp. 558 (E.D.
Mich. 1984); Morris v. Chem-Lawn Corp., 541 F. Supp. 479 (E.D. Mich. 1984); Clif-
ford v. Cactus Drilling Co., 419 Mich. 356, 353 N.W.2d 469 (1984); Watassek v.
Michigan Dept. of Mental Health, 143 Mich. App. 556, 372 N.W.2d 617 (1985).
243. Note, Protecting Employees at Will Against Wrongful Discharge: The Public Pol-
icy Exception, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1931, 1941 (1983).
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doctrine and therefore do not consult attorneys to ascertain whether
they have any legal recourse when they are fired. When they do seek
legal advice, they may be discouraged from pursuing a court suit be-
cause of the monetary and psychic expense involved, even should an
attorney be prepared to accept their case on a contingency fee basis.
And lawyers may be less interested in representing low-income work-
ers since their own share of the award or settlement is likely to be
quite low relative to the amount of time involved in handling such
cases.
A second explanation for underrepresentation of low income em-
ployees in reported cases is the inherent bias in the implied contract
exception to at-will employment. Lower-level workers are generally
not in a position to inquire about or to be assured of job security when
they seek employment. This is especially true when they are unem-
ployed. Nor are they likely to read carefully an employee handbook
which might serve as the basis for an implied contract exception.
The major public policy exception applicable to hourly workers in-
volves dismissal for filing a workers' compensation claim. Such suits,
which were quite common during the early years of the developing
law on wrongful discharge, occur less frequently today. This may be
because in those states where such discharges are unlawful, employers
are less likely to dismiss for filing claims, or if they do so it will be
done on some facially viable pretext.
The relative infrequency with which lower-paid workers are in-
volved in reported wrongful discharge cases may also be due to the
greater likelihood that such cases will be settled without a trial. Given
the expense of litigation to both plaintiffs and defendants as well as
the need of lower income workers for immediate sustenance, the like-
lihood of settlement out of court seems greater than in actions involv-
ing higher-paid employees, who are able to hold out longer and for
whom the amount of potential monetary damages is likely to be much
more lucrative should the case go to trial.
IX. PROPOSED LEGISLATION
Various courses of action have been proposed to deal with wrongful
discharge. Many believe that increased unionization is the answer.
But this is an illusory solution. With unions losing more than half of
all NLRB representation elections, many workers who join or want
union representation remain unprotected against unjust discharge.244
In addition, there are millions of managerial and supervisory employ-
ees who are not covered by the National Labor Relations Act. Finally,
244. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS NEWS (Sept. 3, 1979); BUREAU OF LABOR STA-
TISTICS, EARNINGS AND OTHER CHARACTERISTICS OF ORGANIZED WORKERS, MAY
1980 (1981).
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and most important, the tide of unionization in the United States has
been receding rather than advancing, leaving little likelihood that or-
ganizing is a practical solution to the wrongful discharge problem.
A second approach is voluntary employer action to provide due
process in the workplace. A small number of progressive employers
have established grievance procedures which include impartial arbi-
tration for discharged employees. But this approach cannot begin to
address the magnitude of the unjust discharge problem.245
There are those who believe that the judiciary holds the best prom-
ise for doing away with the anachronistic employment-at-will doc-
trine. Such persons point out that the courts - through the creation
of exceptions to the doctrine - have been moving in the right direc-
tion, and they therefore expect that eventually this movement will
provide protection for all employees against unjust discharge. But
there is absolutely no evidence that the courts are in fact moving to-
ward adoption of full-scale protection against unfair termination.246
Indeed, some courts have begun to withdraw from earlier decisions in
wrongful discharge cases in favor of the view that it is up to the legis-
latures, not the courts, to explicitly address the employment-at-will
issue.24 7
The shortcomings of unjust discharge protection through unioniza-
tion, voluntary employer action, and reliance on the courts lead to con-
sideration of legislative action to provide some viable form of due
process. Legislation has been proposed at both the state and federal
levels.
A bill was proposed in 1980 to amend Section 7 of the National
Labor Relations Act to add the following language: "Employees shall
have the further right to be secure in their employment from dis-
charge or other discrimination except for just cause."2 48 Section 8(a)
was to be amended by adding a new unfair labor practice: "To dis-
charge 'or otherwise discriminate against an employee except for just
cause." 249 The bill never came to a vote in Congress.
A federal statute would have an advantage over state legislation in
that it would make irrelevant the argument that a state providing stat-
utory protection against wrongful discharge would make it less attrac-
tive for industry. We think such an argument is baseless because it
245. The Conference Board, Nonunion Complaint Systems: A Corporate Appraisal
(1980); BNA Policies for Unorganized Employees, PPF Survey No. 125, (April
1979).
246. The Employment-At-Will Issue, 225 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) 23 (Nov. 19, 1982)
(BNA Special Report).
247. See, ag., Murphy v. American Home Prod. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293,448 N.E.2d 86,461
N.Y.S.2d 232 (1983).
248. M. Green, Conceptual Draft of Corporate Democracy Act, (1980) (Public Citizens'
Congress Watch 89) (unpublished).
249. Id.
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magnifies a single factor far beyond its significance in plant location
decisions. Nonetheless, it has been used effectively to discourage sup-
port for state legislation against wrongful termination.
In July 1987, Montana became the first state to enact a comprehen-
sive law protecting at-will employees from wrongful discharge. The
law prohibits employers from discharging employees without "good
cause" as defined in the statute, if the action was in retaliation for the
employee's refusal to violate public policy or if the employer violated
the express provisions of its own written personnel policy. Wrong-
fully discharged employees may be awarded compensatory and puni-
tive damages. 250
The Montana law encourages arbitration of wrongful discharge
claims by providing that a party who makes a valid offer to arbitrate,
that is not accepted by the other party, and who prevails in the courts
is entitled to recover reasonable attorney's fees. If a discharged em-
ployee's offer to arbitrate is accepted by the employer and the em-
ployee prevails, the employer must pay the arbitrator's fee and other
costs of arbitration. Once arbitration is agreed to by the parties, it be-
comes the exclusive remedy for the wrongful discharge dispute and
bars the pursuit of a claim through the courts.251
In Michigan, a bill was introduced during 1983, with hearings being
held in 1984.252 The proposal provided for notifying an employee of
the reasons for discharge, mediation by the Michigan Employment Re-
lations Commission (MERC), and, if mediation is unsuccessful, the
right of appeal by the employee to final and binding arbitration. 25 3
The arbitrator was to be selected jointly by the employer and the em-
ployee from a list provided by MERC, and his or her fee and expenses
would be shared equally by the parties.2 The arbitrator's fee for
study and decision writing was limited to twice the number of hearing
days.255 The arbitrator could sustain the discharge, reinstate the em-
ployee with full, partial or no back pay, or order a severance payment
to be made to the employee. 256 The award was to be reviewable by the
circuit court only for the reason that the arbitrator exceeded or did
not have jurisdiction, the award was not supported by competent, ma-
terial, and substantial evidence, or was secured by fraud, collusion, or
other unlawful means.257
The proposed Michigan Act would exempt from coverage an em-
250. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-901 to 39-2-914 (Supp. 1987)
251. Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act, 1987 Mont. Laws ch. 641 (now codi-
fied at MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-914 (1987)).
252. H.B. 5155, 80th Mich. Leg. (1983).
253. Id. at 2-4 (sections 4-6).
254. Id. at 4 (sections 7-8(1)).
255. Id. at 5 (section 8(1)).
256. Id. at 7-8 (section 11).
257. Id. at 8 (section 13).
[Vol. 67:140
THE MICHIGAN EXPERIENCE
ployer with a grievance procedure providing for impartial, final and
binding arbitration.S A discharged employee who filed a lawsuit
against his or her former employer would be barred from seeking re-
lief under the Act.259 It would also apply to employers of 10 or more
employees.26o To be eligible to seek relief under the Act, an employee
must have worked for an employer for at least 15 hours per week for
six months, and not be protected against unjust discharge by a collec-
tive bargaining agreement, civil service, or tenure.2 61 Managerial em-
ployees and others with a written employment contract of not less
than two years would not be covered.262
Employers have generally opposed statutory protection against un-
just discharge. Despite some extremely generous awards by juries to
dismissed employees, employers prefer to adopt personnel procedures
and policies to avoid or reduce their liability in wrongful discharge
cases rather than extend protection against -unjust discharge to em-
ployees generally - even though the remedies available under arbi-
tration would be much more limited than those awarded through the
judicial process.
The conventional wisdom has been that unions would oppose or
take no position on legislation to protect nonunionized workers
against discharge. This view was based on the assumption that such
legislation would undercut a major union argument in trying to per-
suade workers to vote for unionization. However, in February 1987,
the AFL-CIO Executive Council adopted a resolution supporting both
federal and state measures "that safeguard workers against discharges
without cause."2 63 According to the Council, the following elements
must be included in any viable piece of legislation: a prohibition on
discharges without cause; financing to assure that discharged employ-
ees will be able to enforce their statutory rights; prompt review of
discharge decisions by an independent tribunal; mandatory reinstate-
ment for wrongfully discharged employees; and full compensation for
losses sustained as a result of wrongful discharge.26 4 Prior to the
AFL-CIO action, unions in Michigan, California, and Connecticut had
come out in favor of unjust discharge legislation. The AFL-CIO reso-
lution should make it easier for unions in other states to favor such
legislation.
Support for legislation has also come from the American Civil Lib-
erties Union. In 1987, the ACLU National Board adopted a policy res-
258. Id. at 8 (section 15).
259. Id. at 9 (section 16).
260. Id. at 2 (section 3(2)).
261. Id. at 2 (section 3(1)).
262. Id.
263. Statements adopted by AFL-CIO Executive Council, 34 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) E-8
(Feb. 23, 1987) (regarding the employment-at-will doctrine).
264. Id.
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olution favoring state and federal legislation to protect all private
sector employees against unjust discipline or discharge.265
Trial lawyers who represent plaintiffs and defendants in wrongful
discharge suits have generally opposed legislation that would remove
wrongful discharge claims from the courts. Such legislation would de-
prive attorneys of generous fees - whether they represent plaintiffs
on a contingency fee basis or defend employers against compensatory
and punitive damage claims often running into six or seven figures.
Obviously, fees to be derived by representing relatively high salaried
employees, who have been discharged, far exceed possible income
from actions involving hourly and lower-paid workers.
In order to have a chance for passage, any bill must represent a
compromise among the various interest groups. Such a compromise
might well take the following form:
1. The employment-at-will doctrine would be abolished in favor
of the general rule that employees may be discharged only for just
cause.
2. Discharged workers who are interested primarily in being rein-
stated to their former jobs with compensation for economic loss that
they have suffered would be given an opportunity to have a govern-
ment conciliator try to resolve differences with their employers and, if
conciliation fails, to appeal to an impartial arbitrator. Arbitrators
would be empowered to award monetary damages in cases of unjust
dismissal where reinstatement is not considered to be practicable.
3. Discharged employees who seek exemplary as well as compen-
satory damages for economic loss and who are not interested in rein-
statement would be permitted to sue their former employers in the
courts. Employers would be protected against exorbitant jury verdicts
by establishment of a cap on such awards. This is the approach that
has been adopted by several states for medical malpractice suits in an
attempt to curtail sharply rising insurance premiums for physicians.
Certainly, the mental and emotional distress suffered by discharged
workers is not greater than the pain and suffering of victims of incom-
petent doctors.
4. Recovery of attorneys' fees and costs would be permitted to
prevailing plaintiffs or to defendants when charges against them are
found to be totally without merit and made primarily for purposes of
harassment.
These guidelines would provide much greater protection against
unjust discharge than existing exceptions to at-will employment,
while leaving considerable scope for negotiation in legislatures with
respect to such issues as employee eligibility, employer coverage, arbi-
265. Policy No. 55, "Due Process Rights of Private Employees," ACLU Policy Guide,
(Jan. 24-25, 1987).
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trator selection, allocation of cost, remedies, and other compromises
which are inherent in the legislative process.
